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Abstract 
Cross-border  banking  is  currently  not  stable  in 
Europe.  Cross-border  banks  need  a  European 
safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European-
level  banking  system  may  help  to  break  the 
diabolical  loop  between  the  solvency  of  the 
domestic banking system and the fiscal standing 
of the national sovereign. 
This  policy  paper  first  sketches  the  building 
blocks  of  a  banking  union.  Importantly,  a  new 
European  Deposit  Insurance  and  Resolution 
Authority  (EDIRA)  should  start  simultaneously 
with  the  ECB  assuming  supervisory  powers.  A 
combination  of  European  supervision  and  local 
resolution  cannot  work  because  it  is  not 
‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes 
a  transition  period  to  gradually  phase  in  the 
European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we 
calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund 
would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 
euro  area  banks  that  were  subject  to  the  EBA 
stress  tests.  This  Fund  could  be  created  over  a 
period  of  time  through  risk-based  deposit 
insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once 
up and running, the Fund would then turn into a 
European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund 
to also deal with the resolution of one or more of 
these European banks. 
 
Introduction 
Cross-border banking is not stable in the current 
institutional setting. As national authorities focus 
on preserving the national parts of a cross-border 
bank, the integrated value of a bank is neglected 
in  times  of  crisis.  As  Mervyn  King  has  put  it 
lucidly “banks are international in life but national 
in death”. 
The internal market is built on the free movement 
of  people,  goods,  services  and  capital.  Cross-
border  firms  supply  goods  and  services 
throughout Europe. Cross-border banks facilitate 
the  cross-border  traffic  by  persons  and  firms. 
European  banks  are  thus  an  integral part  of  the 
internal market. 
European  banks  need  a  European  safety  net 
(Veron,  2011;  Marzinotto  et  al.,  2011; 
Schoenmaker, 2012; ECB, 2012). The organisation 
of such a European safety net is a precondition for 
putting the supervisory framework on a European 
footing.  The  endgame  of  resolution  is  driving 
incentives for supervision (Claessens et al., 2010). 
A truly integrated European-level banking system 
can do much to stabilise the eurozone by breaking 
the  ‘diabolical  loop’  by  which  a  weak  domestic 
banking  system  damages  the  sovereign  fiscal 
position  and,  in  the  other  direction,  a  risky 2 | SCHOENMAKER & GROS 
 
sovereign  position  disproportionately  threatens 
domestic banking stability (Lane, 2012). 
However, the European sharing of banking-sector 
risk is only feasible if (national) fiscal weaknesses 
do  not  threaten  banking  stability.  This  requires 
action on two fronts: to induce banks to diversify 
their sovereign risk (e.g. applying large exposure 
limits to sovereign debt) and to redouble efforts to 
ensure  that  national  fiscal  positions  are 
sufficiently robust that they do not tempt national 
governments  to  indirectly  seek  funding  or 
resources from their local banks, which is the aim 
of the Fiscal Compact, which will soon enter into 
force. Exposure limits to (national) sovereign debt 
are still opposed by most member states, but his 
might  change  once  supervision  has  been 
transferred to the ECB.  
In  this  policy  paper,  we  first  show  the  overall 
architecture  for  the  banking  union  in  the  euro 
area.  We  then  sketch  the  building  blocks  for  a 
European  safety  net  for  European  banks.  We 
outline the principles for setting up a safety net. 
Next,  we  provide  a  sketch  of  a  prospective 
European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund. 
In this updated policy paper, we also outline how 
one could structure a gradual transition from the 
national  deposit  insurance  funds  to  the  new 
European fund. This Policy Brief aims to promote 
debate  among  policy-makers,  industry  and 
academia  on  a  European  Deposit  Insurance  and 
Resolution Authority. 
Overall architecture of a banking union 
In the current set-up, the European Commission is 
the  rule-maker  and  the  European  Central  Bank 
(ECB)  the  lender  of  last  resort  for  the  European 
banking system. The European Commission is the 
key policy-maker initiating new policies and rules 
for the financial system. In parallel, the European 
Banking  Authority  (EBA)  has  a  key  role  in 
drafting  technical  standards  and  developing  a 
Single Rule Book for the EU internal market. 
The new proposals for a banking union envisage a 
supervisory role for the ECB. In this policy paper, 
we argue that there is also a need for a European 
Deposit  Insurance  and  Resolution  Authority 
(EDIRA).  The  final  stage  in  the  governance 
framework is the fiscal backstop. Crises affecting 
banks are commonly macroeconomic and general 
in  nature,  following  asset  market  collapses  and 
economic  downturns.  The  existing  national 
deposit insurance and resolution funds can thus 
quickly run out of funds (Spain, Ireland) and need 
the ultimate back-up of government support. But 
a widespread asset market collapse coupled with 
an  economic  downturn  can  push  even  the 
sovereign into insolvency as the cases of Ireland 
and Spain have shown. The sovereign itself will 
then either need a backstop, or the backstop has to 
come  from  a  different  source.  The  European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) was created to provide 
the  fiscal  backstop  for  member  countries,  and 
possibly  also  the  banking  systems  of  member 
countries  in  financial  distress.  The  stability  of  a 
banking system can be assured only if investors 
know that such a backstop exists. The arrow for 
the fiscal backstop is thus backward in Figure 1, 
illustrating  our  backward-solving  approach 
towards governance. 
However,  a  system  under  which  deposit 
insurance  and  resolution  remains  national  while 
supervision  moves  to  the  ECB  would  lead  to 
serious  problems.  When  a  large  bank  is  in 
difficulties, national resolution authorities will try 
to  avoid  recognising  the  problems,  hoping  that 
recourse to cheap emergency financing from the 
ECB will allow the institution to survive. The ECB, 
as  a  supervisor,  would  see  the  problems  and 
would  push  for  remedial  action,  perhaps  even 
resolution,  but might  have  only  limited  powers. 
The national resolution authorities, which would 
have  to  carry  the  burden  of  any  losses,  would 
have  a  tendency  to  accuse  the  ECB  of  being 
excessively  tough  and  putting  national  funds  at 
risk.  In the parlance of economists: a system of 
European  supervision  and  national  resolution  is 
not  ‘incentive  compatible’.  A  European 
underpinning of deposit insurance and resolution 
is  thus  an  indispensable  complement  to  moving 
supervision to the ECB. 
Figure 1 depicts the bodies in this new European 
governance  framework.  While  the  European 
Commission,  the  ECB  and  the  ESM  are  existing 
institutions,  the  EDIRA  would  be  a  new 
institution.  Although  it  is  tempting  to  place  the 
new resolution authority at the ECB, the functions 
of  supervision  and  resolution  should  remain 
separate  (ASC,  2012).  As  supervisors  have 
responsibility  for  the  licensing  and  ongoing 
supervision  of  banks,  they  may  be  slow  to 
recognise (and admit to) problems at these banks. 
Supervisors  may  fear  that  inducing  liquidation 
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cases,  cause  panic  in  the  market.  A  separate 
resolution authority can judge the situation with a 
fresh pair of eyes and take appropriate action with 
much-needed  detachment.  The  private  banking 
sector  also  applies  this  principle  of  separation. 
When  a  bank  loan  becomes  doubtful, 
responsibility is transferred from the loan officer 
to the department for ‘special’ credits to foster a 
‘tough’  approach.  Given  the  need  for  a  fiscal 
backstop, the new EDIRA could operate in close 
cooperation  with  the  ESM.  It  is  nevertheless 
important  to  guard  the  independence  of  the 
resolution  authority,  as  the  ministries  of  finance 
govern the ESM. 
Figure 1. European institutions for financial supervision and stability in a banking union  
 
European 
Commission 
ECB  ECB  EDIRA  ESM 
Note: The framework illustrates the five stages from rule-making to fiscal backstop. The bottom line shows the 
agency responsible for each function. 
Source: Schoenmaker (2013). 
On the geographical reach, it is an open question 
whether the regime starts with all euro area banks 
(as the European Commission, 2012, proposes) or 
only  the  larger  ones.  The  political  dynamics 
suggest  that  a  compromise,  starting  with  those 
banks subject to the stress tests of the EBA that are 
headquartered in the euro area, might be best as it 
would  avoid  the  political  resistance  to 
withdrawing thousands of small banks from the 
area  of  influence  of  national  authorities  (which 
might actually be better placed to supervise them). 
At a later stage the arrangements can of course be 
extended in order to preserve the internal market 
in  banking,  which  has  an  EU-wide  coverage. 
Subject  to  a  rigorous  financial  stability  analysis, 
other member countries could simply opt in. This 
would make sense especially for smaller member 
countries that could thus diversify their risk. 
In the transition towards banking union, the focus 
of  the  European  Commission  is  now  on  the 
regulatory and supervisory front, developing the 
Single Rule Book and the supervisory powers for 
the  ECB.  In  line  with  our  backward-solving 
approach,  it  is  important  that  deposit  insurance 
and resolution are enacted at the same time. Some 
of today’s weak banks may need to be resolved 
(partly wound down and/or recapitalized) before 
they enter the new European supervisory system 
to avoid unlimited contingencies. Countries then 
would have to deal with any legacy problems of 
weak banks. If needed, countries could apply for 
support  from  the  ESM.  Only  well-capitalized 
banks should enter the new European system of 
supervision by the ECB and resolution by EDIRA. 
Principles for a safety net 
Moving  to  the  design  of  a  safety  net,  it  is 
important to have a common understanding of the 
underlying  principles.  The  focus  of  this  policy 
paper is on the resolution stage. See Schoenmaker 
(2012) for a discussion of the role of supervision 
(including  prompt  corrective  action)  and  the 
lender-of-last-resort  role  of  the  central  bank  (in 
casu the ECB). The three basic resolution methods 
for  failing  banks  are  liquidation  with  a  deposit 
pay-off,  a  take-over  with  public  support  and 
direct  public  support.  There  are  seven  golden 
principles for an appropriate safety net:  
1.  Private  sector  solutions  are  preferable.  When 
banks  get  in  difficulties,  private-sector 
solutions  should  be  tried  first.  Private-sector 
solutions  include  recapitalization  by  existing 
shareholders and bondholders (bail-in) and a 
take-over  by  another  bank  without  public 
support. 
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2.  Sufficient  geographical  reach.  To  foster  the 
stability of banks, the safety net should have 
the  same  geographic  reach  as  the  main 
activities of a bank. So European banks need a 
European safety net. 
3.  Least-cost  principle.  The  least-cost  procedures 
require the resolution authority to choose the 
resolution method in which the total amount 
of the expenditures and (contingent) liabilities 
incurred  has  the  lowest  cost  to  the  Deposit 
Insurance  and  Resolution  Fund.  The  only 
exception is if there are systemic risks affecting 
the financial system. 
4.  Private  funds  for  resolution.  The  Deposit 
Insurance  and  Resolution  Fund  should  be 
funded  with  ex-ante  levies  on  the  insured 
banks. In that way, private funds are available 
for resolution. 
5.  Fiscal  backstop.  Crises  affecting  banks  are 
commonly  macroeconomic  and  general  in 
nature,  following  asset  market  collapses  and 
economic  downturns.  The  Deposit  Insurance 
and  Resolution  Fund  can  thus  run  out  of 
funds.  The  ultimate  backup  of  government 
support is needed to give the fund credibility. 
6.  Swift decision-making. Swift decision-making is 
a  crucial  ingredient  of  crisis  management.  A 
myriad of national funds is difficult to activate 
during a crisis and may give rise to conflicts. 
Similarly,  two  separate  funds  for  deposit 
insurance  and  resolution  may  lead  to  inter-
agency  conflicts.  A  single  fund  with  the 
necessary  powers  can  act  swiftly.  More 
generally,  there  is  a  need  to  keep  crisis 
arrangements simple. 
7.  Good  governance.  An  appropriate  system  of 
governance  should  ensure  that  the  Deposit 
Insurance and Resolution Authority is acting 
within  its  mandate.  Moreover,  the  authority 
should be held accountable to the parliament 
and the executive. 
A European Deposit Insurance and 
Resolution Authority 
Deposit insurance and resolution are in principle 
separate  functions.  In  the  US  they  have  been 
combined. The Dodd-Frank Act assigns resolution 
powers  for  large  banks  to  the  Federal  Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in addition to the 
existing FDIC powers for smaller banks. Similarly, 
the  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  of  Japan  has 
resolution powers. By analogy, Allen et al. (2011) 
and Gerhardt & Lannoo (2011) suggest combining 
the two functions within some kind of European 
equivalent of the FDIC. The EU would then also 
get  a  deposit  insurance  fund  with  resolution 
powers.1    The  combination  allows  for  swift 
decision-making.  Moreover,  the  least-cost 
principle  (choosing  between  liquidation  with 
deposit  pay-offs  or  public  support)  can  then 
internally be applied in each case. That would also 
contribute to swift crisis management.  
The European Deposit Insurance and Resolution 
Authority (EDIRA) would be fed through regular 
risk-based deposit insurance premiums from the 
banks  whose  customers  benefit  from  its 
protection, i.e. the European banks. Which banks 
should  fall  under  the  new  European  banking 
regime? A good compromise would be to put all 
the  euro  area  banks  subject  to  EBA  stress  tests 
under the new system. This criterion would imply 
a  very  high  coverage  in  the  countries  under 
financial stress. 
Any new deposit insurance scheme has to face the 
problem of the transition to the new steady state, 
which we will discuss below. The establishment of 
a viable fund is important. A suggestion is to start 
off  with  a  European  Deposit  Insurance  Fund 
funded by deposit insurance premiums. Once the 
Fund is beyond a certain size, it can also be used 
for  resolution,  turning  it  into  a  fully-fledged 
European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund 
(EDIRF).  In  that  way,  private  sector  funds  are 
available for resolution in crisis management. To 
ensure that sufficient private funds are built up, 
the cap on the size of the fund should not be too 
small (as is currently the case with some deposit 
insurance funds). 
National deposit insurance funds have an implicit 
or  explicit  fiscal  backstop  in  the  form  of  the 
national  government.  With  the  ESM  up  and 
running,  a  fiscal  backstop  can  be  easily 
                                                   
1 The bank resolution debate in the EU is currently in a 
state of flux. The first proposal of the Commission in early 
2012 continued to work on the home country approach. 
This  might  now  be  changed  given  the  new  political 
environment. By contrast, the ECB (2012) stressed earlier 
the  need  for  a  euro  area  Resolution  Authority,  to  be 
broadened to an integral EU resolution framework on a 
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implemented  for  a  euro  area  based  EDIRA.2  All 
one would need for an EU-wide system would be 
a  burden-sharing  mechanism  between  the  ESM 
and  the  other  member  countries  (Goodhart  & 
Schoenmaker,  2009).  In  the  case  of  the  rescue 
package  for  Ireland  in  2010,  the  euro-outs  (UK, 
Denmark  and  Sweden)  joined  in  the  burden-
sharing following the ECB capital key, as British 
banks  were  exposed  to  Ireland  and  would  thus 
also  benefit  from  enhanced  financial  stability  in 
Ireland.  That  shows  that  burden-sharing  can  be 
widened if and when needed. 
A prospective EDIRA could be established by an 
EU  regulation,  akin  to  the  establishment  of  the 
European  Supervisory  Authorities  and  the 
European Systemic Risk Board. The chair would 
accordingly  be  accountable  to  the  European 
Parliament. To play its role, EDIRA would need to 
have  full  access  to  information  on  the  financial 
condition of the European banks. The exchange of 
information has always been a major obstacle to 
international  cooperation  (Schoenmaker,  2013). 
Supervisors  are  reluctant  to  share  confidential 
information about banks under their supervisory 
wing  for  two  reasons.  First,  and  fundamentally, 
supervisors may lose discretion for dealing with 
emerging problems when they share information 
with another body. Second, supervisors are afraid 
that  confidential  information  may  become 
available  to  parties  (including  government  and 
parliament)  that  should  not  have  access  to 
information  on  individual  cases.  Such  leakage 
could create a reputation problem if the receiving 
body  cannot  guarantee  restricted  access  to  the 
confidential information only to those concerned 
with supervision and resolution. At this point, the 
request  for  information  could  be  organised 
similarly  to  the  US  FDIC,  which  can  collect 
information for resolution and deposit insurance 
purposes. In that way, the EDIRA would not be 
fully  dependent  on  the  ECB  for  receiving 
information. Ultimately, the preferred route is that 
the ECB, as supervisor, would share information 
with the EDIRA, as resolution agency, to reduce 
reporting burdens on banks. 
Next, the chair would need a working relationship 
with the European Commission and the European 
Council for general banking policies, including the 
                                                   
2 Art. 15 of the ESM Treaty explicitly allows for financial 
assistance for the re-capitalization of financial institutions 
of an ESM member. 
arrangements  for  the  fiscal  backstop.  But  the 
EDIRA would be fully independent in individual 
cases.  A  further  question  is  where  to  place  the 
newly  envisaged  EDIRA  in  the  institutional 
architecture.  Beck  et  al.  (2012)  suggest  that  a 
stand-alone  deposit  insurer  will  be  tougher  on 
interventions  to  protect  depositors.  Supervisors 
may be more lenient in case of regulatory capture 
by  banks.  Using  an  incomplete  contracts 
approach,  Repullo  (2000)  concludes  that  deposit 
insurance should be separate from lender of last 
resort, while lender of last resort and supervision 
may  be  combined.  Following  this  analysis,  we 
suggest  that  the  EDIRA  should  be  independent 
from the ECB. 
Transition 
The  transition  to  a  new  system  of  deposit 
insurance is difficult enough during normal times, 
when  ‘the  veil  of  ignorance’  could  ensure  that 
there are no clear winners or losers. However, at 
the  present  juncture  of  the  euro  crisis,  some 
banking  systems  or  groups  of  banks  clearly 
represent a higher risk than others. This makes the 
transition  even  more  difficult.    We  propose  a 
gradual phasing in of both premia and protection, 
which should take care of this problem.   
Agreement on some underlying principles may be 
useful  to  guide  the  transition.  We  propose  the 
following: 
  Keep  total  deposit  insurance  at  €100,000  per 
depositor,  as  the  existing  Deposit  Guarantee 
Schemes  Directive  has  adopted  maximum 
harmonisation. 
  Build a target fund of 1.5% (as proposed by the 
European  Commission  and  the  European 
Parliament)  of  covered  deposits  gradually 
over a period of ten years. 
  Avoid  double  payment  of  premia  by  banks 
(national  plus  EU)  to  ensure  a  neutral 
transition. 
  Avoid  the  need  to harmonise  national  funds 
by letting them continue to operate in parallel. 
  Combine  deposit  insurance  and  resolution 
within one fund to keep things simple. 
  Construct the EDIRA as a source of strength 
(‘credible’  fund)  to  foster  confidence  in  the 
European banking system. 6 | SCHOENMAKER & GROS 
 
Starting with the last principle, full coverage of all 
deposits in the banks that would fall under ECB 
supervision (labelled ‘European banks’) from day 
one is not feasible. But the end point also should 
be  clear:  a  European  Deposit  Insurance  and 
Resolution  Fund  –  as  proposed  by  us  earlier 
(Schoenmaker & Gros, 2012) – run by an EDIRA 
should become the authority that makes decisions 
on  resolution  and  provides  the  payments  to 
depositors when required. 
In  more  concrete  terms,  we  propose  that  the 
protection offered by the EDIRA should be phased 
in the following way: 
  In  the  first  year,  the  EDIRA  will  guarantee 
only €5,000 per depositor. This amount could 
then  be  increased  each  year  by  the  same 
amount  until,  after  20  years,  the  European 
protection scheme insures the full €100,000 per 
depositor.  It  would  of  course  be  possible  to 
accelerate  the  transition  by  increasing  the 
amount  added  to  the  European  scheme  by 
more than €5,000 per year. For example, with 
€10,000,  the  transition  would  take  only  ten 
years.  But  as  our  concern  is  to  show  how  a 
phasing-in could work, rather than the precise 
amount, we will continue with the example of 
€5,000. 
  The coverage of the national deposit guarantee 
schemes  will  be  reduced  by  the  amounts 
guaranteed  at  the  European  level.  Following 
the  first  principle,  that  would  keep  the  total 
coverage at €100,000. The risk for the national 
guarantee schemes would of course go down 
as  the  European  guarantee  increases  in  size. 
The national schemes would lose their raison 
d’être over time, but in order to diminish their 
opposition  to  the  new  EU-level  system,  they 
should  be  left  alone,  rather  than  threatening 
them with immediate extinction. 
  Contributions  by  the  ‘European  banks’  to 
EDIRA should of course be phased in as well. 
Although  a  totally  neutral  scheme  might 
reduce opposition, we sketch a slightly quicker 
phasing-in of the contributions, which may be 
useful  given  the  weak  state  of  the  banking 
system  almost  everywhere  in  the  euro  area. 
The  premium  for  the  European  fund  for  the 
first year should be set at 0.0075% of insured 
deposits (5% of the 0.15% required to build up 
the  1.5%  of  deposits  over  ten  years);  for  the 
second year at 0.015%, etc.3 
  Contributions  to  national  schemes  would  be 
reduced  correspondingly  for  the  ‘European 
banks’, which might then pay only 95% of the 
national premium. 
  After 20 years in the case of a €5,000 increment 
per year (or ten years with a €10,000 annual 
increment), the full coverage for the European 
banks will be provided by the European fund. 
In our example, EDIRA would have collected 
about 0.8% of covered deposits in premiums 
after 20 years. Because of the gradual phasing 
in, it will then take another five years to reach 
the target of 1.5% of covered bonds.4 
  Accumulated  contributions  of  the  European 
banks  left  in  the  national  funds  after  the 
transition  period  can  be  transferred  to  the 
EDIRA,  which  would  then  provide  a 
proportional discount on any premia from the 
banks from these countries. 
During  the  transition,  European  banks  in 
countries  without  an  ex-ante  fund,  like  the 
Netherlands,  would  gradually  reduce  their 
liability to the national fund in steps. After four 
years, for example, a European bank would only 
contribute  80%  to  a  local  failure,  while  the 
national banks would contribute the full 100%. 
Once their contributions to the European fund are 
above  a  certain  level,  the  European  banks  may 
find strong ECB supervision useful to reduce their 
potential  liabilities.  If  that  were  to  happen,  the 
new  EDIRA  would  truly  act  as  a  source  of 
strength for the banking system. 
                                                   
3  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  we  refer  here  only  to  the 
average  premium.  Actual  premia  of  individual  banks 
could of course be higher or lower, depending on the risk 
characteristics of the institution. 
4 The calculations get more complicated if a national fund 
already exists, so that national premia can be lowered. An 
example  may  clarify  this  proposal.  A  national  fund 
applies  a  25%  discount  on  its  premium.  The  European 
bank based in that country would pay 75% of the national 
premium for €95,000 cover to the national fund in the first 
year. The national fund transfers 25% of the fee for €5,000 
cover to the European fund. The relevant banks pay the 
European  fund  the  fair  premium  (as  calculated  above) 
minus  the  discount  for  the  national  fund  transfer 
(assuming that premiums are not calculated in the same 
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Some numbers 
The  proposal  would  be  to  put  all  the  euro  area 
banks subject to EBA stress tests under the new 
system. That would amount to 75 European banks 
with  assets  of  €21.591  billion  (see  Annex,  Table 
A1). An alternative scenario is to include all euro 
area  banks,  as  the  European  Commission  (2012) 
proposes.  The  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes 
Directive (94/19/EC as amended by 2009/14/EC) 
provides  a  harmonised  cover  of  €100,000 
throughout the EU. Table 1 reports the assets and 
rough  estimates  of  covered  deposits  for  both 
scenarios. 
A precise estimate of the covered deposits held at 
the banks which should come under EDIRA is not 
possible  because  banks  publish  (and  sometimes 
even have themselves) very little information on 
their deposits. For a precise estimate one would 
need to distinguish between retail and wholesale 
deposits, know how many deposits per depositor 
and finally the proportion of these deposits under 
€100,000 per depositor. 
However,  a  recent  study  by  the  Joint  Research 
Centre of the EU (European Commission, 2010a) 
allows one to make a rough estimation based on 
December 2011 data for total euro area deposits of 
residents,5 taken from the ECB. These amounted 
to  close  to  €11,000  billion,  which  leads  to  an 
estimate  of  covered  deposits  of  about  €2,700 
billion  for  the  75  European  banks  and  €4,150 
billion for all euro area banks.6  
As mentioned, the European Commission (2010b) 
proposes  to  build  an  ex-ante  Deposit  Insurance 
Fund of 1.5% of covered deposits over a period of 
ten  years.7  1.5%  of  the  €2,700  billion  in  covered 
                                                   
5 Classified as ‘Other general government/other euro area 
residents’. 
6 The share of the EBA stress tested banks in this total is 
estimated  at about  two  thirds  (in  line  with  the  share in 
assets, see Table A.1 in the Annex). The JRC impact study 
(European  Commission,  2010a)  suggests  that  eligible 
deposits  amount  to  about  55%  of  this  and  covered 
deposits to about 70% of the remainder.  
7  The  proposal  for  a  new  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes 
Directive  (European  Commission,  2010b)  is  entirely 
blocked.  The  European  Parliament  and  the  EU  Council 
have not reached agreement. The Council did not want to 
further  than  0.5%  funding.  The  EP  wants  to  keep  the 
Commission  figure  of  1.5%.  The  EP,  seeing  the  Council 
did not want to move, adopted its report in first reading in 
February 2012. It is the only measure so far of the post-
crisis measures not adopted in single reading. 
deposits would yield a fund of about €40 billion. 
Given the uncertainties surrounding this estimate, 
we propose a range of €30-50 billion. Initially the 
required contributions under the gradual phasing 
would  cover  only  1/20  of  10%  of  the  1.5%,  or 
about  €200  million  per year  for  all  75  European 
banks together. For all euro area banks, 1.5% of 
the €4,150 billion in covered deposits would give a 
fund  of  about  €60  billion.  Here,  we  propose  a 
range of €50-70 billion. 
Table 1. Target size of deposit insurance fund 
  
Total assets 
(€ billion) 
Covered 
deposits 
(€ billion) 
Target size 
of fund 
(€ billion) 
75 European 
banks  21,590  2,690  30-50 
All euro area 
banks  33,540  4,140  50-70 
Note: Total euro area assets of banks are taken from Table A.1. 
The amount of covered deposits is based on ECB figures on 
deposits and ratios in the impact assessment of the European 
Commission’s  Deposit Guarantee  Schemes (DGS) proposal. 
The target size of the deposit insurance fund is set at 1.5% of 
covered deposits. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
By  comparison,  the  Dodd-Frank  Act  requires  a 
minimum size of the US Deposit Insurance Fund 
of 1.35% of covered deposits. If there is a shortfall, 
the  FDIC  must  adopt  a  restoration  plan  that 
provides that the fund will return to 1.35% within 
eight years. If the fund exceeds 1.5% of deposits, 
the FDIC must pay dividends to the fund member 
banks. 
Finally, the European Commission proposes that 
banks pay ex-post levies of up to 0.5% of covered 
deposits,  if  necessary.  Ex-ante  funds  will  thus 
cover  75%  of  the  financing  of  the  Deposit 
Insurance Fund and ex-post contributions of 25%. 
But  the  collection  of  this  ex-post  levy  will  be 
uncertain in crisis times. 
To  put  the  numbers  in  perspective,  the  EDIRA 
would amount to €30-50 billion of private funds 
accumulated from contributions by the European 
banks  as  a  first  line  of  defence  for  deposit 
insurance  and  resolution,  while  the  ESM 
(scheduled  to  start  in  autumn  2012)  amounts  to 
€500 billion of public funds underwritten by the 
euro  area  members  as  a  fiscal  backstop  for 
sovereign  countries  as  well  as  financial 
institutions.  An  interesting  question  is  whether 8 | SCHOENMAKER & GROS 
 
the EDIRA could cope with the failure of one or 
more  European  banks. Dermine  (2000)  takes  the 
book  value  of  equity  as  a  yardstick  for  the 
potential costs of a rescue package. Table A.2 in 
the Annex reports the Tier 1 capital of some of the 
largest  European  banks  (with  assets  over  €200 
billion). The sums of reported capital range from 
about €5 to 75 billion. Once fully up and running, 
the  EDIRA  could  resolve  one  of  the  largest 
European  banks  or  two  to  three  mid-size 
European  banks.  These  figures  clearly  show  the 
benefits of pooling. The current national deposit 
insurance funds would generally not be capable of 
dealing with the failure of even one of their own 
largest banks. 
Concluding remarks 
If policy-makers seek to enhance global banking, 
then the international community must provide a 
higher  and  better-coordinated  level  of  fiscal 
support  than  it  has  in  the  past  (Obstfeld,  2011). 
The safety net, comprising deposit insurance and 
resolution,  implies  a  credit  risk  that  ultimately 
must  be  lodged  somewhere.  The  same  point 
applies  to  the  European  framework.  If  policy-
makers  want  to  preserve  the  internal  market  in 
banking, then the institutional framework requires 
three  elements  that  form  a  comprehensive 
package:  
 
1.  Lender  of  last  resort.  The  ECB  is  already 
operating as the lender of last resort for the 
European banking system. 
2.  Supervision. The ECB must supervise, at least, 
the  large  cross-border  banks.  Supervision 
would  then  move  from  a  national  mandate 
(with  loose  coordination)  to  a  European 
mandate. 
3.  Resolution  and  deposit  insurance.  A  European 
Deposit  Insurance  and Resolution Authority 
(EDIRA) should be established to stabilise the 
retail deposit base and resolve troubled cross-
border  banks.  The  European  Deposit 
Insurance and Resolution Fund would be fed 
through regular risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums with a fiscal backstop of the ESM. 
The second element is now being addressed, but 
giving the ECB supervisory powers risks creating 
new  distortions  if  deposit  insurance  and 
resolution  remain  at  the  national  level.  In  this 
policy  paper,  we  spell  out  some  underlying 
principles to guide for a gradual transition under 
which  only  future  risks  would  be  shared  while 
past  losses  would  remain  at  the  national  level. 
This paper shows that ultimately a new European 
Deposit  Insurance  and  Resolution  Authority 
would serve as a genuine source of confidence in 
the European banking system. A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND RESOLUTION FUND - AN UPDATE | 9 
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Table A.1 EBA stress-tested banks 
Country 
EBA stress-tested banking groups 
Total assets* 
(€ billion) 
Total assets 
(€ billion) 
% of country 
assets 
Number of 
banks 
Eurozone 
Austria  398  39%  3  1,010 
Belgium  698  58%  2  1,201 
Cyprus  71  54%  2  132 
Germany  5,205  62%  13  8,393 
Spain  3,391  94%  24  3,621 
Finland  92  14%  1  644 
France  6,009  72%  4  8,399 
Greece  335  70%  6  477 
Ireland  364  28%  3  1,314 
Italy  2,071  51%  5  4,070 
Luxembourg  40  4%  1  1,099 
Malta  7  13%  1  51 
Netherlands  2,548  105%  4  2,425 
Portugal  341  59%  4  573 
Slovenia  22  42%  2  52 
Subtotal  21,591  64%  75  33,538 
Non-eurozone 
Denmark  705  4 
Great Britain  6,813  4 
Hungary  32  1 
Norway  274  1 
Poland  43  1 
Sweden  1,465  4 
Subtotal  9,332  15 
Total  30,923  90 
* Total assets from ECB: Aggregated balance sheet of euro area monetary financial institutions, 
 excluding the Eurosystem. 
Source: ECB (2012) and CEPS private database on EU banks maintained by the Financial Markets research unit. 
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Table A.2 Large banks in the euro area, ranked according to assets (2011 figures) 
   Banks* 
Total assets 
(€ billion) 
Tier 1 capital 
(€ billion) 
1  Deutsche Bank (Germany)  2,164  49 
2  BNP Paribas (France)  1,965  71 
3  Crédit Agricole (France)  1,880  62 
4  Banco Santander (Spain)  1,251  62 
5  Société Générale (France)  1,181  37 
6  Groupe BPCE (France)  1,138  41 
7  ING Bank (Netherlands)  961  39 
8  UniCredit (Italy)  927  43 
9  Rabobank Group (Netherlands)  732  38 
10  Commerzbank (Germany)  662  26 
11  Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy)  639  37 
12  Credit Mutuel (France)  605  28 
13  BBVA (Spain)  598  34 
14  Dexia (Belgium)  413  6 
15  Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank (Germany)  406  10 
16  ABN Amro Group (Netherlands)  405  15 
17  Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (Germany)  373  14 
18  Bayerische Landesbank (Germany)  309  14 
19  Bankia (Spain)  298  13 
20  KBC Group (Belgium)  285  16 
21  CaixaBank (Spain)  282  20 
22  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (Italy)  241  12 
23  Hypo Real Estate (Germany)  237  6 
24  Nord/LB Norddeutsche Landesbank (Germany)  228  8 
25  Erste Group (Austria)  210  12 
 
Top 25  18,390  713 
* With assets of more than €200 billion. 
Source: The Banker top 1000 World Banks (July 2012) and CEPS private database on EU banks maintained by the 
Financial Markets research unit. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • Fax: 32 (0)2 219 41 51 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
•  Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 